Ep. #66 – Simplicity & Modal Collapse w/ Christopher Tomaszewski
Summary
Divine Simplicity faces a significant objection from “modal collapse.” If God is simple and His one simple act of creation is identical to Himself, then doesn’t that imply creation is necessary? How can the absolutely simple God bring about a world chock full of contingency? Christopher Tomaszewski, a PhD student at Baylor, joins us to discuss his article responding to the “modal collpase” objection.
Guest Bio
Christopher Tomaszewski is a graduate student working on a Phd in philosophy at Baylor University. He has made presentations at the 2017 Central Division Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers and the 2018 Southwest Regional Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. Also, he has published one article in the peer-reviewed journal “Analysis” on the topic of Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse.
PhD Student at Baylor University
Show Outline
In the first segment, Christopher Tomaszewski gives some highlights of his background in philosophy of religion. He explains what is meant by the term modal and divine simplicity.
In the next segment, Tomaszewski presents a version of the argument from modal collapse made popular by R.T. Mullins. Interestingly, Tomaszewski explains that the argument is formally invalid. Additionally, he argues, if the argument were correct, it would cut against all theists who claim God is the creator.
In the final segment, Tomaszewski addresses a deeper worry about God’s unchanging action being the cause of a contingent world. He notes that he will be exploring this further. Lastly, he provides us with several resources for diving deeper.
Tomaszewski’s Summary of the Argument from Modal Collapse
- Necessarily, God exists.
- God is identical to God’s act of creation.
- Necessarily, God’s act of creation exists.
Tomaszewski’s Parody Argument to Help Show the Form is Invalid
- Necessarily, 8 > 7.
- The number of planets = 8.
- Necessarily, the number of planets > 7.
Resources Mentioned
Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument by Christopher Tomaszewski
Christopher Tomaszewski’s Personal Website
R.T. Mullins Essay Critiquing Divine Simplicity (The exchange between Mullins and Feser can be read here as well)
My Reply to Mullins’ Reply to Feser
Thinking About God by Brian Davies
Absolute Simplicity (article) by Stump and Kretzmann
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy Entry on Divine Simplicity
Related Episodes
Ep. #64 – Absolute Divine Simplicity w/ Dr. Dolezal
BONUS|Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation w/ Dr. Kerr
Ep. #65 – Simplicity & the Trinity w/ Paul Chutikorn
All Tomaszewski’s argument shows is that a particular formulation of the modal collapse argument is vague, not that it is invalid. The issue is with the modal scope of the second premise, which is different in the collapse argument and the parody argument. Let us disambiguate the parody argument first – modally, the second premise could take two forms:
1. In all possible worlds, 8 > 7.
2. The number of planets = 8 in all possible worlds.
3. In all possible worlds, the number of planets > 7.
This form is valid, but has a false premise – the number of planets is not 8 in all possible worlds.
What about a different form:
1. In all possible worlds, 8 > 7.
2. The number of planets = 8 in some possible worlds.
3. In all possible worlds, the number of planets > 7.
The premises are true, but the argument does not follow. So there is no form in which the argument can follow through. However, this does not apply to the collapse argument:
1. In all possible worlds, God exists.
2. God is identical to God’s act of creation in all possible worlds.
3. Necessarily, God’s act of creation exists.
The argument is valid and the second premise (as well as the first) is believed true by the thomists. Thus thomists should believe it is true.
Hello Jabberwock,
Thanks for the comment. Tomaszewski explains more in the podcast and even more in the paper. In the final argument in your post, premise (2) is not accepted by Thomists. In other words, Thomists need not accept:
(2) God is identical to God’s act of creation in all possible worlds.
The reason is because God does not have to create, and so in the possible worlds where God does not create (the God alone world), God is still identical to God’s act, but God’s act is not an act *of creation*. So, rather, the Thomist would stick to:
(2*) God is identical to God’s act of creation in some possible worlds.
Namely, the possible worlds where God creates. I say a little more about this in a post here: http://www.classicaltheism.com/mullins
Finally, I agree that Tomaszewski’s paper does not address all forms of modal collapse (though Tomaszewski is adamant that no valid form of the argument with premises accepted by Thomists has yet to be produced). Steven Nemes is another classical theist who has addressed at least one additional form of modal collapse here: http://www.classicaltheism.com/nemes
Keep your eye on the literature if you’re interested since there will be more papers out in 2020 cataloguing the state of modal collapse discussions.
Peace,
John
Sure, thomists need not to accept the premise, but the argument is now valid (as I see Tomaszewski admits in the second part of the article).
However, I cannot see how thomists can even do that. Consider the following:
1. God is identical in all possible worlds.
2. God is identical to the act of creation in some possible worlds.
3. God is identical to the act of non-creation in some possible worlds.
4. The act of creation and the act of non-creation are identical.
Do you agree with the conclusion?
Your comment on Mullins entails yet another problem, I will sum it up under the post.
Thanks, Jabberwock, for further comment. I can tell you have studied this issue and are interested in it. I encourage you to keep an eye out for some literature on this in the near future. Johnny Waldrop has a paper coming out responding to Tomaszewski, yet Tomaszewski is adamant that none of the modal collapse formulations (that he has looked at) succeed in showing an actual modal collapse.
Re: “Do you agree with the conclusion?”
Yes and no. Steven Nemes and Dwight Stanislaw have pointed out that “act of creation” is an ambiguous term (e.g. this episode). It could refer to the ‘causal sense’ or the ‘effectual sense’. If it refers to the causal sense (i.e. that power in virtue of which the effect is brought about), then I agree (4) is true since God (i.e. Himself) is that power in virtue of which creation (or no creation) is brought about. If it refers to the effectual sense (i.e. that which is brought about), then I would deny (4) since in an act of creation there are positive effects brought about whereas if there is no creation there are no such effecs.
I hope this helps you in understanding the current state of the dialogue. I’m happy to go back and forth a little more, but this is pretty much the end of my understanding as a non-expert.
Thank you for your reply!
You might want to check out my response to your other Mullins post, as it picks up where the discussion here has left us.