Ep. #108 – Apophaticism & Divine Personhood w/ Dr. Hewitt
Summary
What is apophaticism? Why is it important for Christians? Is God a person? Why have some classical theists said that God is not a person? Dr. Simon Hewitt joins us to answer those questions and discuss some of his own work on these subjects.
Guest Bio
Dr. Simon Hewitt earned his PhD from the University of London. He specializes in philosophy of language, philosophy of logic and mathematics, metaphysics, philosophy or religion, and analytic theology. Currently, he is a research fellow at the University of Leeds.
NOTE: There are some issues with the audio quality of this recording. I apologize for any inconvenience. Dr. Hewitt presents similar ideas with better quality audio on this episode of Ryan Mullins’ podcast.
Topics Covered
- What is apophaticism?
- Why is it important for the Christian?
- You say, “God is not a person” but if that’s the case a) how can we have a relationship with him and b) isn’t he three persons?
- What arguments do you provide in your paper against God’s personhood?
- Why can’t the pantheistic God be a person?
- How does that analysis apply to some other theists?
- What are your thoughts on this objection from a philosopher?
Resources
God is not a person (an argument via pantheism) by Dr. Simon Hewitt
Simon Hewitt’s Appearance on RT Mullins’ podcast
Catechism of the Catholic Church Quotes Lateran IV
Admittedly, in speaking about God like this, our language is using human modes of expression; nevertheless it really does attain to God himself, though unable to express him in his infinite simplicity. Likewise, we must recall that “between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying an even greater dissimilitude”; and that “concerning God, we cannot grasp what he is, but only what he is not, and how other beings stand in relation to him.”
CCC 43, emphasis mine [the bold quotation is from the Fourth Lateran Council]
Anonymous Philosopher’s Objection to Hewitt’s Argument
“[H]is argument for non-personhood has a weak link. The argument depends on the premise that a being cannot reason with beings it mereologically overlaps. The justification given is this: “Suppose that x is a person and y a part of x. y has a reason to ϕ. Can it be the case that x does not have a reason to ϕ? It is surely flatly incoherent given the admission that x has a part with a reason to ϕ to say this.” However, the term “has” is ambiguous between “mereologically includes” and “exemplifies.” There is no incoherence in including parts that have properties the whole lacks. So suppose God has (exemplifies) reasons that are distinct from the reasons God’s parts have. Then we should add that the whole is metaphysically prior to its parts.”
Related Episodes
Ep. #56 – The Doctrine of Analogy w/ Dr. Delfino
Ep. #100 – Divine Simplicity & the Holy Trinity w/ Fr. Thomas Joseph White
