Davies Responds to the Problem of Evil (Part 2)

19 Responses

  1. Liam says:

    Hello. It seems to me that it is better to frame these questions in terms of metaphysical possibility than in terms of morality. Would you say there are certain actions that are logically but not metaphysically possible for God?

    • John DeRosa says:

      Hmm, good question, I’m not sure. Perhaps you can elaborate further?

      • I’m just wondering if classical theism is able to avoid all of the issues raised by the problem of evil. For example, one can ask if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity. If the theist says this would be metaphysically impossible for God, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be metaphysically possible for God can be discussed. If the theist says it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity, then the nontheist can ask if God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this. If the theist says God would not be worthy of worship if he had done this, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be prevent God from being worthy of worship can be discussed. If the theist says God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this, then the question of why God is worthy of worship can be discussed. It seems to me that classical theism does not make the problem of evil a non-starter.

        • John DeRosa says:

          Excellent questions, Liam! Let me think about these a bit and get back to you. Thanks for stopping by the website.

        • Jim the Scott says:

          I might as well take a running stab at this. Too bad it is a late Post.

          >I’m just wondering if classical theism is able to avoid all of the issues raised by the problem of evil. For example, one can ask if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity.

          Scholastic don’t believe in “Libertarian Free Will” in the sense that view of free will presupposes Kantian metaphysics and Scholastics and other Thomist & Essentialists reject said metaphysics. Thomist presuppose the intellect moves the will to the good where as the Kantians & other voluntarists believe the Will moves the intellect and has primacy.

          So we don’t believe God made that scheme of free will because that view of metaphysics is wrong.

          If you rephrase the question to mean ” if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have free will and allow them to suffer for all eternity.” I would say no since God’s ontological and metaphysical goodness prevent Him from making an evil that is a final cause or end in and of itself.

          In essence God cannot allow any evil to exist without bring good out of it.

          > If the theist says this would be metaphysically impossible for God, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be metaphysically possible for God can be discussed.

          Well Brian Davies does go out of his way to explain God cannot be considered good in any fashion if he allow evil to exist as an end in and of itself for no good reason whatsoever. God can create a water world with fish and allow a super nova to vaporize it five minutes after creating it. But God cannot create fish to live in a world without water just so he can watch them flop around till they sufficate.

          There is a subtle distinction here.

          God not being a moral agent does not mean God can do any evil or allow any and all evil without limits.

    • John DeRosa says:

      Hi Liam, sorry for the delay. I have a google doc open where I’ve typed some initial thoughts to your questions, but I’d like to do a little more research and try to make the reply more concise. I just wanted you to know I haven’t forgotten about your excellent questions!

      • John DeRosa says:

        Re: “I’m just wondering if classical theism is able to avoid all of the issues raised by the problem of evil.”

        Let’s distinguish. Just because classical theism, on Davies’ analysis, is able to avoid some (or many) issues typically raised by the problem of evil, that does not imply it avoids all issues. In fact, his account raises quite a few metaphysical issues related to the nature of evil, God’s causation, and so forth, which he treats at length in his books. When I wrote these blog posts a few years ago, I may have been a bit too cavalier with the language which suggests to some that all problems are easily solved!

        Re: “It seems to me that classical theism does not make the problem of evil a non-starter.”

        So, perhaps it’s not right to talk about THE problem of evil (though I do use that language a lot). Rather, on the analysis of Davies, McCabe, Brown, etc., many renditions of the problem of evil do not get off the ground. In particular, they respond to charges implying God is a good moral agent not living up to the perfect standards of moral goodness as we judge them. However, that does not mean all problems are immediately solved and that no more questions can be asked. Also, it should be noted that other Catholics like Eleonore Stump and Trent Dougherty handle the problem of evil very differently from Fr. Davies. And, you happen to raise a very good series of questions! Let’s turn to that.

        Re: For example, one can ask if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity.

        I suppose it would depend how you define libertarian freedom, but there are definitely many Christians (typically Calvinists) who would say not only this is metaphysically possible, but this is the world that God has created. Perhaps you instead mean a scenario like this:

        Could God create a world of human beings with no freedom of any sort (libertarian, compatibilist, etc.) to make moral choices and punish them with suffering for all eternity?

        I would say no. Of course, God has enough power in his omnipotence to bring about logically possible states of affairs, but he is also constrained by his rational nature. In other words, if something involves acting irrationally or a contradiction, then we can deny it’s something God can bring about. So, human beings who have no freedom is really a contradictory concept, since humans are rational animals who have some form of freedom.

        Could God create a world of sub-human animals with no freedom of any sort and punish them with suffering for all eternity?

        This scenario is more speculative and tricky, but again I would say no. In the chapter on good, evil, and causation, Fr. Davies that God only brings about what is good, and it’s within his prerogative to bring it about that good things curtail the goodness of other good things in our material world. For example, when God brings about lions that eat lambs, we have the goodness of lions curtailing the goodness of the lamb.

        Now, since sub-rational animals do not have immortal souls, they do not by nature exist for all eternity (on a Thomistic analysis). So, it does not seem to make sense to speak of sub-human animals suffering for all eternity (since they do not exist for all eternity), nor does it make proper sense to speak of punishment (since non-rational animals don’t commit moral wrongs).

        Of course, we can keep tweaking the scenarios: “Could God create a world…” and some of them we may be able to answer confidently and others more tentatively. The tenativeness of some answers will be due to the fact that we may not be able to see all of the ins and outs of different possible worlds, and if we could see all of the ins and outs, it may end up having something inherently irrational or contradictory in it.

        Perhaps there’s an analogy to a mathematical idea, “There exists a set of all sets.” That seems quite reasonable to say. If there exist sets, then why couldn’t there be a big set that contained all the sets? However, even though it does not contain an obvious contradiction, it turns out on analysis to entail a contradiction, and therefore, we know there cannot be “a set of all sets.”

        Re: If the theist says this would be metaphysically impossible for God, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be metaphysically possible for God can be discussed.

        If the classical theist arguments for God are correct, then we find ourselves in a world made by God. And if that’s so, then this world clearly is metaphysically possible for him to create (since he created it!). Of course, someone can question the warrant for classical theism. But, Fr. Davies argues that most typical problems of evil do not count against the view (and I agree).

        Re: “If the theist says it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity, then the nontheist can ask if God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this.”

        So, as I mentioned above, many Christians (typically Calvinists) think God did just this and he is worthy of worship. Why is he so worthy? Typical answers might include that he is Holy, Good, and the creator of all creaturely goodness. However, as classical theists, we would not claim any deep insight into God’s mysterious divinity. We can say it’s true that he is Holy and Good (and we can predicate things of God analogously), but we don’t have a strong grasp on what God’s holiness and goodness actually are because they transcend our finite categories.

        Re: “If the theist says God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this, then the question of why God is worthy of worship can be discussed.”

        Yes, that can definitely be discussed. But for the classical theist, the reason God is worthy of worship will involve both that He is goodness itself and that He has created us as the type of creatures who find our fulfillment in relationship with Him. But, as Fr. Davies argues, the “goodness itself” does not mean the same thing as “human moral goodness.”

        Thanks again for these questions, Liam, as they have reminded me I need to research these ideas further. I hope to do some more writing on these topics and update the blog in the future.

  2. Chavoux Luyt says:

    But isn’t God good? And isn’t goodness a moral value? I agree with the idea that God is not subject to human morality… He is God after all, and “playing God” is actually immoral for a human. But He has a good and holy character. And his moral commands to humans are outflows of his character. To claim that He is neither good nor evil (or have no morality) does not seem to fit the biblical description of God, IMHO.

    • John DeRosa says:

      Good question, Chavoux. On Davies’ account, God is indeed good, but his goodness need not be construed as moral goodness like that of an agent who behaves well with respect to various duties, virtues, or obligations. I also agree there are ways to affirm God’s holy and good character (his righteousness, justice, etc.) as Scripture does without committing to the idea that he’s a perfectly well-behaving moral agent. Instead, we can construe God’s goodness as an infinite metaphysical goodness. I say a little more about your objection in this video starting at 7:55 https://youtu.be/BK5ENwX-SOc?t=475

  3. Michael says:

    Parts 3 and 4 seem not to exist!

  4. If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so,God acts as a moral agent. Just not a Good one.

    The Bible, supposedly a revelation from God claims God is good, fair, just, compassionate, merciful, is love and is righteous. Thus the attributes of God supposedly from a trustworthy revelation from god tells us God is like us in having and understanding these attributes. The Bible also repeatedly tell us God approves of these moral attributes, and gives commands to be like wise. With examples of what that means. See Isaiah 1 for an example.

    Thus we end up redefining God, Good, moral agent, compassionate, merciful fair et al. Similar to this is the related claim God owes us no moral obligations. Compassion,mercy etc means accepting moral obligations to God’s creations.

    • John DeRosa says:

      Thanks, William, for the comment. Some brief replies:

      Re: “If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so, God acts as a moral agent.”

      What do you mean by ‘moral agent’ here?

      Re: “The Bible, supposedly a revelation from God claims God is good, fair, just, compassionate, merciful, is love and is righteous. Thus the attributes of God supposedly from a trustworthy revelation from god tells us God is like us in having and understanding these attributes.”

      That these are used in divine revelation mean its appropriate to speak about God in these ways and as having these attributes *in some sense*. But, it doesn’t follow that God is “like us” in the sense that he has the attributes *just like we do*. Classical theists often explain that we speak about God analogously. See this episode here for more on that: http://www.clasicaltheism.com/analogy

      Re: “The Bible also repeatedly tell us God approves of these moral attributes, and gives commands to be like wise. With examples of what that means.”

      This is fully compatible with God not being a moral agent in the sense that Davies argues.

      • William C. Barwel says:

        A moral agent is a conscious agent who can act morally. Either eliminating a great moral evil, or refusing to do so even if it is in that agent’s power to do so.

        We are told that God authored the Bible. Council Of Trent, Session Four and Verbum Dei – 1965.

        We are told God is good including numerous sub-goodnesses. Merciful, compassionate, And the bible has numerous verses telling us God wants us to have these subgoodness. The Bible repeatedly tells us what these sub-goodneses mean. Isaiah 1, Luke 6 and many other verses. Thus these sub-goodnesses cannot not be claimed to be some attributes mere humans cannot understand. Not when applied to God. The Bible makes these sub-goodnesses explicit. And tells us these are attributes of the biblical God.

        We cannot argue then that these sub-goodness are figurative, metaphorical, or not univocal. We cannot claim these attributes must be understood analogically as some theologians claim. Merciful does not mean analogically not merciful, compassionate not compassionate.

        And to be compassionate or merciful is to accept moral obligations. Thus, the God of the Bible has moral obligations, and no matter how God acts or refuses to act, God is indeed a moral agent.

        Theology cannot solve the Problem Of Evil with these sorts of word games.

        • John DeRosa says:

          Hi William,

          Thanks for the engagement. My thought on this has developed somewhat in the few years since I wrote these blog posts. I do intend to update them (or do an update episode/writing on the topic). Feel free to follow-up then on those new posts when they occur.

          Re: A moral agent is a conscious agent who can act morally.

          I don’t deny that, but it’s not super informative. What do you mean by conscious agent? What do you mean by “act morally”? One of the keys to the move I’m making in the article (and Davies is making) is that even if you want to say God “acts morally”, the import of that phrase is going to be radically different for God than it is for human creatures.

          Re: “We are told that God authored the Bible.”

          Amen. But the Bible uses a wide variety of language about God. Some language is undoubtedly metaphorical and non-literal (e.g. “God’s nostrils” and “God’s bowels” referred to in Psalms).

          Re: “We are told God is good including numerous sub-goodnesses. Merciful, compassionate, And the bible has numerous verses telling us God wants us to have these subgoodness. The Bible repeatedly tells us what these sub-goodneses mean. Isaiah 1, Luke 6 and many other verses. Thus these sub-goodnesses cannot not be claimed to be some attributes mere humans cannot understand. Not when applied to God. The Bible makes these sub-goodnesses explicit. And tells us these are attributes of the biblical God.

          We cannot argue then that these sub-goodness are figurative, metaphorical, or not univocal. We cannot claim these attributes must be understood analogically as some theologians claim. Merciful does not mean analogically not merciful, compassionate not compassionate.”

          You assert that we cannot argue this but do not explain why. Why can’t the Bible use analogical language? Dr. James Dolezal provides a look at Biblical language about God in this recent episode. If you’d like, I’d recommend listening to that episode and then responding in the comments beneath it if you want to pursue this topic of Biblical language about God.

          Peace,
          John

    • Chavoux Luyt says:

      “If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so,God acts as a moral agent. Just not a Good one.”
      But this assumes two things:
      1. God is not acting to eliminate horrendous moral evil. As a Christian I would argue that in Jesus Christ, his perfect life, and death and resurrection through which He started his Kingdom on earth, God has indeed acted to eliminate horrendous moral evil – and is continuing to do so: every sinner that repents and becomes a follower of Jesus Christ is one bit less of horrendous moral evil in this world.
      2. Eliminating horrendous moral evil is something that can and should be done immediately without having any undesirable consequences. In the words of God through his prophet:
      “Say to them, As I live, declares the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn back, turn back from your evil ways, for why will you die?” To eliminate all moral evil also implies that all moral agents of evil (human beings) be removed. And on the day that this happens, the time for repentance, forgiveness, change, turning back to God, will be past forever. As long as God allows evil-doers the opportunity to turn to Him and change, He logically has to allow them to do both good or evil, as they choose.

    • Jim the Scott says:

      Re:If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so,God acts as a moral agent. Just not a Good one.

      This is just logically absurd. So if Michael Jordan could play a good Football game and does not act to do so Michael Jordan acts as a football player just not a good one?

      This statement is just incoherent if not absurd. If Michael Jordan is not a football player then he doesn’t as one, good or bad. If God is not a moral agent in the univocal way a maximally virtuous creature is a moral agent then God cannot act as either a good or bad moral agent.

      Sophistry does not help here.

  5. William C. Barwell says:

    Michael Jordan is not omnipotent. We are told God is. Foolish category mistake.

  6. William C. Barwell says:

    Michael Jordan is not omnipotent. We are told God is. Foolish category mistake. Michael Jordan might have a good excuse for a bad game. God never does

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